The Supreme Court and Information Privacy by Cate, Fred H & Cate, Beth E.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2012
The Supreme Court and Information Privacy
Fred H. Cate
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, fcate@indiana.edu
Beth E. Cate
Indiana University - Bloomington, becate@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
This Editorial is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cate, Fred H. and Cate, Beth E., "The Supreme Court and Information Privacy" (2012). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2614.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2614
The Supreme Court and information privacy
Fred H. Cate* and Beth E. Cate**
Introduction
The US Supreme Court has written a great deal about
‘privacy’ in a wide variety of contexts. Between 1970
and 2011, the Court used the term ‘privacy’ in 631 opi-
nions. In just over half (328 opinions) did an opinion
significantly address some aspect of privacy.
The breakdown of those 328 opinions offers insight
into the contexts in which the Supreme Court concerns
itself with privacy (Figure 1). Not surprisingly, most of
these opinions addressed privacy rights that the Court
has found are protected by the US Constitution. The
largest single category by far was cases involving a ‘rea-
sonable expectation of privacy’ under the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution (210, or 64 per cent of
opinions), including the extent to which privacy rights
are implicated, or violated, by searches or seizures that
are initiated or conducted by private parties with some
degree of government involvement. Opinions involving
the First Amendment and freedom of expression and
association issues accounted for 18 per cent (59), a
large portion of which involved reviews of obscenity
regulations and prosecutions. Fourteen opinions (4 per
cent) involved what the Court has come to call ‘deci-
sional privacy’, namely the privacy rights the Court has
found implied in the Constitution that protect the
rights of adults to make decisions about activities such
as reproduction, contraception, the education of their
children, and sexual intimacy. A handful of opinions
(16, or 5 per cent) involve the privacy-related charac-
teristics of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
self-incrimination.
Aside from constitutional privacy issues, 20 (6 per
cent) of the Court’s opinions involving privacy
addressed the application of the two privacy exemp-
tions to the Freedom of Information Act. A significant
number of opinions (69, or 21 per cent) did not fit
neatly within any single discrete category, but reflect a
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Abstract
† Advances in technology—including the growing
use of cloud computing by individuals, agencies,
and organizations to conduct operations and store
and process records—are enabling the systematic
collection and use of personal data by state and
federal governments for a variety of purposes.
† These purposes range from battling crime and
terrorism to assessing public policy initiatives
and enforcing regulatory regimes. To aid these
efforts, governments are promoting mandatory
retention and reporting of data by online service
providers and the expansion of laws that facili-
tate wiretaps to greater portions of the web.
† The legal framework for protecting individual
privacy within this growing world of ‘big data’ is
patchy and in critical ways outdated. Most of the
current framework was erected in response to
pronouncements by the Supreme Court over the
years regarding the scope of constitutional
privacy protections. Widespread agreement over
the need for legislators to update the statutory
regime has not yet produced results.
† Against this backdrop, the US Supreme Court
has struggled in recent cases to articulate work-
able constitutional and statutory privacy norms
that can help guide government, and individuals,
in a world of digital and distributed data. An
examination of the Court’s privacy jurisprudence
over the past forty years offers a number of
insights into how the Court, and policy-makers,
may achieve a balance between privacy and data
use that accords with constitutional norms,
serves vital public policy goals, and secures
greater public trust and support.
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range of other statutory or common-law issues includ-
ing statutory privacy rights and common law privacy
torts; and evidentiary privileges and rules that reflect
privacy or confidentiality norms (such as the attorney–
client privilege and attorney work product doctrine).
The total number of opinions does not add up to 328
(or the total percentages to 100 per cent) because a
number of opinions addressed more than one aspect of
privacy.
The breadth of the Court’s constitutional privacy
jurisprudence reflects the fact that even though privacy
is not protected by name in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has interpreted many of the amend-
ments constituting the Bill of Rights to protect various
elements of privacy. These include an individual’s right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by
the government;1 the right to make decisions about
issues involving ‘fundamental’ individual liberty inter-
ests such as contraception,2 abortion,3 marriage, pro-
creation, child rearing, and sexual intimacy;4 the right
not to disclose certain information to the government;5
the right to associate free from government intrusion;6
and the right to enjoy one’s own home free from intru-
sion by the government,7 sexually explicit mail8 or
radio broadcasts,9 or others who would disrupt one’s
solitude.10
In the pages that follow we provide an overview
of the Supreme Court’s treatment of privacy, first in
its constitutional exposition, and second in its
statutory interpretation, with an emphasis on FOIA.
We conclude with a brief analysis of the apparent in-
consistency within the Court’s jurisprudence of
what constitutes a ‘reasonable expectation’ of
privacy and some thoughts on where the Court’s
privacy jurisprudence may be heading in the context of
developing norms and policies that shape government
access to personal data, particularly sizeable amounts
of data in databases maintained by private-sector
sources.
Constitutional sources of a privacy right
Fundamental rights in the United States are articulated
in the federal Constitution. Two features of those rights
are central to understanding the role of the Constitu-
tion in protecting privacy. First, rights articulated
in the Constitution generally are protected only
against government action.11 All constitutional rights—
whether to speak freely, confront one’s accusers, be
tried by a jury of one’s peers—regulate the public, but
not the private, sector. In the absence of state action,
therefore, constitutional rights are not implicated in
questions surrounding privacy.12 The second significant
characteristic of constitutional rights is that they are
generally ‘negative’; they do not obligate the govern-
ment to do anything, but rather to refrain from taking
actions that abridge constitutionally protected rights.
Fundamental rights of personal decision
making
The US Supreme Court’s most controversial constitu-
tional right to privacy has developed within a series of
cases involving decision making about contraception,
abortion, and other issues involving intimate or famil-
ial relations. Indeed, decisional ‘privacy’ rights are
better thought of, and often characterized by the
Court, as rights of personal autonomy.13
Figure 1 US Supreme Court cases involving privacy, 1970–2011
Note: n ¼ 328, total greater than 100% due to double-counting
1 Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Id. at 152–3; Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 Whalen v Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
6 NAACP v Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
7 Stanley v Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
8 Rowan v Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
9 Federal Communications Commission v Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
10 Frisby v Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Carey v Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980).
11 Only the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery, applies directly
to private parties. Clyatt v United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216–220 (1905).
12 Although state action is usually found when the state acts toward a
private person, the Supreme Court has also found state action when the
state affords a legal right to one private party which impinges on the
constitutional rights of another, see New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376
U.S. 264, 265 (1964), and in rare cases when a private party undertakes a
traditionally public function, see Marsh v Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946),
or when the activities of the state and a private entity are sufficiently
intertwined to render the private parties’ activities public, see Evans v
Newtown, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
13 See Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Gonzales v Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (‘legal challenges to undue
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some
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In 1965, the Supreme Court decided in Griswold v
Connecticut that an 80-year-old Connecticut law for-
bidding the use of contraceptives violated the constitu-
tional right to ‘marital privacy’.14 The justices voting to
strike down the law identified a variety of constitution-
al sources for this right. Justice Douglas, writing the
opinion for the Court, drew on notions of privacy
implied within several provisions of the Bill of Rights:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of as-
sociation contained in the penumbra of the First Amend-
ment is one. . . . The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumer-
ation in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.’15
Justice Douglas concluded in a now-famous turn of
phrase that the ‘specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance’.16
Justices Goldberg and White, agreeing that the Con-
necticut law was invalid, focused on the Ninth Amend-
ment and wrote that the autonomy of married couples
to decide whether or not to have children was a funda-
mental and traditional right retained by the people.
Justice Harlan’s concurrence grounded the privacy right
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,17 which he believed protected certain ‘values im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty’, among them
the right of married couples to engage in contraception
without interference by the government.
Justice Harlan’s reliance on the Due Process Clause
emerged in subsequent cases as the dominant view of the
constitutional basis for decisional privacy rights. Most
controversially, eight years after Griswold, the Court, in
Roe v Wade, recognized a constitutional privacy right,
grounded in Due Process, that encompasses ‘a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy’.18
The Court looked to ‘the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action . . .’19 To guard against the potential for justices to
greatly limit the scope of permissible legislative action by
transforming their own policy preferences into constitu-
tionally protected “liberties,” the Court in Roe v Wade
emphasized that the constitutional ‘guarantee of person-
al privacy’ only includes ‘personal rights that can be
deemed “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty” . . .’20 The Court specified that those
fundamental rights include activities concerning mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education.21 Government regula-
tion of those activities ‘may be justified only by a “com-
pelling state interest”,’ and they must be ‘narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake’22—
a standard described as ‘strict scrutiny’.
Although the Supreme Court indicated that govern-
ment intrusion into inherently private areas of personal
life would be subject to strict scrutiny, the Court over
time has come to apply a lesser form of scrutiny to reg-
ulations involving abortion, and to emphasize the im-
portance of balancing privacy with the government’s
valid regulatory interests.23 Currently regulations
imposed on pregnant women seeking abortions prior
to fetal viability will be upheld as long as they do not
impose an ‘undue burden’ on access to abortion.24
Similarly, in Lawrence v Texas,25 the Court held that a
state law criminalizing private sexual conduct between
consenting same sex couples failed to pass muster
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s
autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal
citizenship stature’.)
14 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court later extended
constitutional rights of access to contraception to unmarried
individuals, see Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (‘[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
or not to bear or beget a child’).
15 Id. at 484.
16 Id.
17 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: ‘No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .’ US Constitution
amend. XIV. The Fifth Amendment applies an identical prohibition to
the federal government. US Constitution amend. V.
18 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
19 Id.
20 Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
21 Id. at 152–3.
22 Id. at 155.
23 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
24 Id. After viability a state’s interest in preserving the potentiality of the
life of the fetus outweighs the mother’s privacy rights and the state may
ban abortion altogether except when needed to save the life or protect
the health of the mother. Stenberg v Carhart, 530 US 914 (2000). But see
Gonzales v Carhart (n 13) (rejecting facial challenge to federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Act of 2003, which does not contain an exception to the
ban on partial-birth abortions to protect a woman’s health, but not
ruling out challenges to individual applications of the law).
25 539 U.S. 558.
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under the Due Process Clause. Although restating that
the freedom to make intimate personal choices is
central to the liberty protected by Due Process, the
Court ultimately employed a much lower standard of
review than strict scrutiny and found that the state law
was not rationally related to furthering any legitimate
government interest.26
The Court’s decisional privacy jurisprudence gener-
ally does not concern issues of informational privacy.
In the abortion context, however, the Court has
addressed certain rules that implicate informational
privacy concerns. For a number of years following Roe
v Wade, the Court struck down state laws that required
pregnant women, including minors, to obtain spousal
or parental consent to abortion (at least in the absence
of an alternative when parental consent is unavailable
or inappropriate),27 and also struck down rules requir-
ing women to receive information about risks and
alternatives that the Court found to be designed to
deter a woman from having an abortion.28 In 1992,
however, the Court upheld a requirement that abortion
patients receive an ‘informed consent’ booklet with in-
formation on risks and alternatives, a 24-hour waiting
period, and a requirement that minors get the written
consent of at least one parent, finding that none of
these requirements unduly interfered with the right to
access abortion.29 In doing so, the Court signalled its
willingness to balance individual information privacy
rights with other firmly held policy values.
Protection against Government-compelled
disclosure of personal matters
In addition to weighing the privacy issues raised by
compelled disclosures in the abortion setting, the
Supreme Court has addressed privacy in the context of
a more general constitutional right against govern-
ment-compelled ‘disclosure of personal matters’.30 In
1977, the Supreme Court decided Whalen v Roe, a case
involving a challenge to a New York statute requiring
that copies of prescriptions for certain ‘scheduled’
(lawful but dangerous) drugs be provided to the state.
The state enacted the statute to combat overprescrip-
tion of drugs that were making their way into an illegal
market; patients, doctors, and physician associations
challenged the law on the basis that the requirement
would infringe patients’ privacy rights. Echoing Gris-
wold, the unanimous Court wrote that the constitu-
tionally protected ‘zone of privacy’ included ‘the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters’.31
Nevertheless, having found this new privacy interest
in the non-disclosure of personal information, the
Court did not apply strict scrutiny, a standard typically
reserved for cases involving ‘fundamental’ interests.
Instead, applying a lower level of scrutiny, the Court
found that the statute did not infringe the individuals’
interest in non-disclosure.32 The Court also explicitly
rejected the application of the Fourth Amendment right
of privacy to broad government data collection pro-
grammes for regulatory purposes, writing that Fourth
Amendment cases ‘involve affirmative, unannounced,
narrowly focused intrusions’.33 The Supreme Court has
never decided a case in which it found that a govern-
ment regulation or action violated the constitutional
privacy right recognized in Whalen.34
Yet the Court in Whalen provided a comparatively
subtle and modern understanding of what ‘privacy’
means:
26 Id. at 573–4, 577–8.
27 Eg Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Bellotti v Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); City of Akron v Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
28 Akron(n 27); Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
29 Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
30 Whalen v Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977).
31 Id. at 599–600.
32 Id. at 603–4.
33 Id. at 604, n.32. In Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S.
425 (1977), the Court rejected claims by President Nixon that privacy
rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were violated by the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which required
him to provide his presidential papers and recordings for archiving,
with purely private and personal materials being returned to him. The
Court quoted Whalen in support of a constitutional-level ‘individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’, and like Whalen
employed a balancing test to determine ultimately the ‘reasonableness’
of the government’s data collection. Unlike Whalen, the Nixon Court
conducted the balancing test in Fourth Amendment terms: finding a
limited expectation of privacy in the materials at issue, weighing that
interest against the strong public interest in preserving presidential
papers and the extensive procedural protections against unwarranted
disclosure of private information, and concluding that the archival
requirements were reasonable and thus constitutional. Id. at 455–65.
The more direct reliance on Fourth Amendment principles to resolve
the privacy claims is perhaps unsurprising given that the law in
question applied only to the Nixon presidential records and
no others.
34 Several federal appeals courts have relied on Whalen, however, to find
that a government regulation or action violated an individual’s
constitutional privacy right in nondisclosure of personal information.
See, eg Tavoulareas v Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Barry v City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983); Schacter v
Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978); Doe v Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980), Plante v
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), and Doe v Attorney General,
941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991). Courts in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, in
contrast, have severely limited the scope of the Whalen nondisclosure
privacy right, see Walls v City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir.
1990), and J.P. v DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981). Taking
Whalen’s lead, those courts that have relied on the right of
nondisclosure have applied only intermediate scrutiny, instead of the
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We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government
files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare
and social security benefits, the supervision of public
health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforce-
ment of the criminal laws all require the orderly preserva-
tion of great quantities of information, much of which is
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or
harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use such data
for public purposes is typically accompanied by a con-
comitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarrant-
ed disclosures.35
The Court recognized that ‘in some circumstances that
duty [to avoid unwarranted disclosures] arguably has
its roots in the Constitution’.36 The New York statute
did not violate the Constitution, the Court concluded,
because it ‘evidence[d] a proper concern with, and pro-
tection of, the individual’s interest in privacy’ by au-
thorizing limited access to the data reported and
requiring physical and electronic security measures to
protect against unauthorized access.37 The Court con-
cluded: ‘We therefore need not, and do not, decide any
question which might be presented by the unwarranted
disclosure of accumulated private data—whether inten-
tional or unintentional—or by a system that did not
contain comparable security provisions.’38
In NASA v Nelson,39 a six-justice majority of the
Court essentially hewed to Whalen’s analysis in reject-
ing a constitutional privacy challenge to certain ques-
tions included in an agency’s background check
procedure for contract employees. The Nelson Court
weighed the competing interests of the agency (this
time, as an employer rather than a regulator) and its
personnel in obtaining and withholding, respectively,
information about current drug use treatment and
counselling and other information that may bear on an
employee’s suitability for employment, using a ‘reason-
ableness’ standard. Two factors substantially influenced
the Court’s conclusion that the data collection was rea-
sonable and lawful: the fact that public and private
employers widely use such background checks, and, as
in Whalen, the existence of statutory protections (this
time, under the federal Privacy Act) against public dis-
closure of the information collected. The Court rejected
arguments that the drug treatment and suitability data
were exposed to unreasonable risks from Privacy Act
exemptions permitting disclosures of personal informa-
tion for ‘routine uses’, or evidence of a significant
number of prior government data breaches (788 at 17
agencies in three years). The Court stated that the
‘mere possibility that security measures will fail pro-
vides no “proper ground” for a broad-based attack on
government information-collection practices’, and
emphasized the limited nature of the actual ‘routine
uses’ of background check data made by NASA.40
Notably, the Court assumed, without deciding, the
existence of Whalen’s constitutional privacy ‘interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters’ to the govern-
ment, suggesting that the Court might revisit that
premise in a future case.41 Justices Scalia and Thomas
declared in concurring opinions that ‘[a] federal consti-
tutional right to “informational privacy” does not exist’
and ‘the Constitution does not protect a right to infor-
mational privacy’.42
First Amendment
The Court has identified a number of privacy interests
implicit in the First Amendment.43 For example, in
NAACP v Alabama,44 the Court struck down an
Alabama ordinance requiring the NAACP to disclose its
membership lists, finding that such a requirement was
an unconstitutional infringement on NAACP members’
First Amendment right of association.45 And in Stanley
v Georgia,46 the Court explicitly linked privacy and free
expression by identifying the mutual interests they
serve. The Court overturned a conviction under Georgia
law for possessing obscene material in the home. While
the ‘[s]tates retain broad power to regulate obscenity’,
Justice Marshall wrote for the unanimous Court, ‘that
power simply does not extend to mere possession by the
strict scrutiny typically used to protect fundamental constitutional
rights. See Doe v Attorney General, 941 F.2d at 796.
35 Id. at 605.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 605–6. As discussed further below, the federal Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. §§552a (2010), sets out certain statutory (as distinct from
constitutional) limits on disclosure of personal information within
federal agency databases, although as with other statutory privacy
protections, exemptions to these limits are a mile wide and are likely to
impose few meaningful constraints on data sharing and use in the
efforts (law enforcement, counterterror, regulatory compliance)
described above.
39 562 U.S. __ (2011).
40 Id. at __.
41 The majority declined to reach the issue because the parties and amici
had not briefed or fully addressed it. Id. at __ n.10.
42 Id. at __ (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); id. at __ (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment). Justice Kagan did not participate in the
consideration of the case or decision.
43 ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceable to assemble . . .’ U.S.
Constitution amend. I.
44 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
45 Id. at 464–65.
46 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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individual in the privacy of his own home’.47 The Court
based its decision squarely on the First Amendment,
which the Court found included the ‘right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusion into one’s privacy’.48
More often, however, the Court identifies privacy as
an interest in tension with the First Amendment’s pro-
tection for freedom of expression and press. In Breard
v City of Alexandria,49 for example, the Court upheld
an ordinance prohibiting solicitation of private resi-
dences without prior permission. The Court found in
the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee an impli-
cit balance between ‘some householders’ desire for
privacy and the publisher’s right to distribute publica-
tions in the precise way that those soliciting for him
think brings the best results’.50
The Court has invoked this same implied balancing
test in numerous other cases. In Kovacs v Cooper,51 the
Court upheld a Trenton, New Jersey ordinance prohi-
biting the use of sound trucks and loudspeakers:
[t]he unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may
be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to
take it. In his home or on the street he is practically help-
less to escape this interference with his privacy by loud-
speakers except through the protection of the
municipality.52
In Rowan v U.S. Post Office,53 the Court upheld a
federal statute which permitted homeowners to specify
that the Post Office not deliver to their homes ‘erotical-
ly arousing’ and ‘sexually provocative’ mail. In Federal
Communications Commission v Pacifica Foundation,54
the Court allowed the Federal Communications Com-
mission to sanction a radio station for broadcasting
‘indecent’ programming, finding that ‘the individual’s
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder’.55 In Frisby v
Schultz,56 the Court upheld a local ordinance that
banned all residential picketing, writing that the home
was ‘the one retreat to which men and women can
repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily
pursuits’57 and ‘the last citadel of the tired, the weary,
and the sick’.58 In Carey v Brown,59 the Court wrote
that ‘the State’s interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the
highest order in a free and civilized society’.60
When privacy rights conflict with free expression
rights before the Court, the latter usually prevail. When
information is true and obtained lawfully, the Court
has repeatedly held that the state may not restrict its
publication without showing a very closely tailored,
compelling governmental interest. Under this require-
ment, the Court has struck down laws restricting the
publication of confidential government reports,61 and
of the names of judges under investigation,62 juvenile
suspects,63 and rape victims.64 Moreover, there can be
no recovery for invasion of privacy unless the informa-
tion published is highly offensive to a reasonable
person and either false65 or not newsworthy.66 And the
Court has accorded a variety of procedural protections
to all expression, whether true or false.67
The Court recently revisited the balance between
freedom of expression and privacy in Sorrell v IMS
Health Inc.68 Sorrell involved a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a Vermont law prohibiting the sale, disclosure, or
use of prescriber-identifiable information in pharmacy
and related records for use in marketing or promoting
prescription drugs. The law was aimed at combating ex-
pensive, targeted ‘detailing’ campaigns by drug represen-
tatives using prescribed-specific data obtained from
pharmacies, insurers, and so on via data mining compan-
ies; the state also argued, however, that the law was
designed to safeguard prescriber privacy.69
Justice Kennedy, writing for the six-justice majority,
assumed that ‘for many reasons, physicians have an
47 Id. at 568.
48 Id. at 564.
49 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
50 Id. at 644.
51 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
52 Id. at 86–87.
53 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
54 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
55 Id. at 748.
56 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
57 Id. at 484 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 455).
58 Id. (quoting Gregory v City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black,
J., concurring)).
59 447 U.S. 455 (1980). The Court in Carey struck down an Illinois
ordinance which generally prohibited residential picketing but permitted
certain labour picketing; the Court rejected the state’s argument that the
law properly balanced privacy interests with special solicitude for
labour-related speech, emphasizing that picketing rules designed to
protect privacy should be drawn without regard to the content of the
speech. Id. at 470–71.
60 Id. at 471.
61 New York Times Co. v United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
62 Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
63 Smith v Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
64 Florida Star v B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
65 Cantrell v Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
66 Florida Star, 491 U.S. 254.
67 Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (requiring that the
standard for summary judgment motions take into account the
plaintiff ’s burden at trial); Bose Corp. v Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485
(1984) (requiring independent appellant review).
68 564 U.S. __ (2011).
69 No patient-identifiable information was involved the disclosures.
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interest in keeping their prescription decisions confi-
dential’, and strongly suggested that a state law that
closely guarded the confidentiality of such information
and allowed its disclosure and use ‘in only a few
narrow and well justified circumstances’ would be
upheld against the type of challenge brought by the
pharmaceutical companies.70 The majority concluded,
however, that prescriber data were widely available
without prescriber consent to others, including ‘coun-
terdetailers’ promoting non-prescription drugs, and
therefore the law was insufficiently tailored to serve its
stated privacy goals.71
Strikingly, though, Justice Kennedy ended the major-
ity opinion with a strong statement—one that echoes
to some extent the concluding observations in Whalen,
above—about the importance of privacy and the risks
posed to it by technology-enabled access to and use of
personal data held by the government or elsewhere:
The capacity of technology to find and publish personal
information, including records required by the govern-
ment, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect
to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure. In
considering how to protect those interests, however, the
State cannot engage in content-based discrimination to
advance its own side of a debate.
If Vermont’s statute provided that prescriber-identifying
information could not be sold or disclosed except in narrow
circumstances then the State might have a stronger pos-
ition. Here, however, the State gives possessors of the infor-
mation broad discretion and wide latitude in disclosing the
information, while at the same time restricting the informa-
tion’s use by some speakers and for some purposes, even
while the State itself can use the information to counter the
speech it seeks to suppress. Privacy is a concept too integral
to the person and a right too essential to freedom to allow its
manipulation to support just those ideas the government
prefers.72
Fourth Amendment
One of the colonists’ most potent grievances against
the British government was its use of general searches.
The hostility to general searches found powerful ex-
pression in the Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.73
Framework
The Fourth Amendment does not purport to keep the
government from conducting searches or seizing per-
sonal information. It only prohibits ‘unreasonable’
searches and seizures, but is silent about what makes a
search or seizure ‘unreasonable’. In 1886, the Supreme
Court first applied the term ‘priva[cy]’ to the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment,74 and for 80 years
focused its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on
whether a search required government officials to tres-
pass on private property. In Olmstead v United States, 75
for example, five of the nine justices found that wiretap-
ping of telephone wires by federal officials did not con-
stitute a search or seizure since there had been no
physical trespass and nothing tangible had been taken.
In 1967, the Court decided Katz v United States,76 a
case involving the constitutionality of federal author-
ities’ use of an electronic listening device attached to
the outside of a telephone booth used by Charles Katz,
whom the authorities suspected of violating gambling
laws. The Court found that this method of gathering
evidence infringed on Katz’ Fourth Amendment rights,
even though his property had not been invaded. The
Court wrote that ‘[t]he Fourth Amendment protects
people not places’, and therefore applies to whatever
one ‘seeks to preserve as private, even in an area access-
ible to the public’.77
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan introduced what
was later to become the Court’s test for what was
‘private’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.78 Justice Harlan wrote that the protected zone of
Fourth Amendment privacy was defined by the indivi-
dual’s ‘actual’, subjective expectation of privacy, and the
extent to which that expectation was ‘one that society
was prepared to recognize as “reasonable”.’79 The Court
adopted that test for determining what was ‘private’
70 Id. at __, __.
71 The dissent argued that the majority overstated the access by others to
prescriber data, citing state professional responsibility rules limiting
disclosure of such data, the similarity of the exceptions in Vermont’s law
to exceptions in the major federal health privacy law (the Health
Insurance Privacy and Accountability Act, or HIPAA), and the absence
of record evidence indicating the widespread use of prescriber data for
counterdetailing. Id. at __ (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at __ (emphasis added).
73 U.S. Constitution amend. IV.
74 Boyd v United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–26 (1886).
75 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
76 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
77 Id. at 351.
78 Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in 1968
and has applied it with somewhat uneven results ever
since.80 The Court has found ‘reasonable’ expectations of
privacy in homes,81 businesses,82 sealed luggage and
packages,83 and even drums of chemicals,84 but no ‘rea-
sonable’ expectations of privacy in voice or writing
samples,85 phone numbers,86 conversations recorded by
concealed microphones,87 and automobile passenger
compartments,88 trunks (car boots),89 and glove boxes.90
The Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amend-
ment generally to require that searches be conducted
only with a warrant issued by a court, even though this
is not a requirement contained in the amendment
itself.91 For a court to issue a warrant, the government
must show ‘probable cause’ that a crime has been or is
likely to be committed and that the information sought
is germane to that crime.92 The Court also generally
requires that the government provide the subject of a
search with contemporaneous notice of the search.93
The Fourth Amendment’s protection, while consid-
erable, is not absolute. The Supreme Court has carved
out a number of exceptions to the warrant require-
ment; for example, warrants are not required to search
or seize items in the ‘plain view’ of a law enforcement
officer,94 for searches that are conducted incidental to
valid arrests,95 for searches that serve ‘special needs’
unrelated to law enforcement (eg warrantless drug tests
of high school athletes and railway employees),96 and
for searches specially authorized by the Attorney
General or the President involving foreign threats of
‘immediate and grave peril’ to national security.97
Moreover, the Supreme Court interprets the Fourth
Amendment to apply only to the collection of informa-
tion, not its use. Even if information is obtained in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
has consistently found that the Fourth Amendment
imposes no independent duty on the government to
refrain from using it. ‘The Fourth Amendment contains
no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence
obtained in violation of its commands, and an examin-
ation of its origin and purposes makes clear that the
use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure
“[works] no new Fourth Amendment wrong”.’98
Under the Court’s ‘exclusionary rule’, illegally seized
data may still be used if the government agent acted in
good faith,99 to impeach a witness,100 or in other set-
tings in which the ‘the officer committing the unconsti-
tutional search or seizure’ has ‘no responsibility or duty
to, or agreement with, the sovereign seeking to use the
evidence’.101 The Court suppresses the use of informa-
tion obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
only when doing so would have deterred the conduct of
the government employee who acted unconstitutionally
when collecting the information. So, for example, the
Court has allowed records illegally seized by criminal
investigators to be used by tax investigators on the basis
that restricting the subsequent use would not deter the
original unconstitutional conduct.102 Protecting privacy
is not a consideration. The Court wrote in 1974 that the
exclusionary rule operates as ‘a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gener-
ally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved’.103 If the
Court finds no independent Fourth Amendment basis
for restricting the use of illegally obtained information,
it goes without saying that the Court does not apply the
Fourth Amendment to restrict the use of lawfully
obtained information. The Fourth Amendment today
thus poses no limit on the government’s use of lawfully
seized records, and in the case of unlawfully seized ma-
terial restricts its use only to the extent necessary to
provide a deterrent for future illegal conduct
The Miller Exclusion of Third-Party Records
The Supreme Court held in 1976 in United States v
Miller104 that there can be no reasonable expectation of
80 Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
81 Camara v Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
82 G.M. Leasing Corp. v United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
83 United States v Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Arkansas v Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979); Walter v United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
84 United States v Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
85 United States v Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
86 Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
87 United States v White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
88 New York v Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
89 United States v Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
90 South Dakota v Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
91 Akihl Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure 3–4 (Yale
University Press, New Haven, CT 1997).
92 68 American Jurisprudence 2nd edn, Searches and Seizures § 166 (1993).
93 Richards v Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
94 Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
95 United States v Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
96 Vernonia School Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner v Railway
Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see also City of Ontario v
Quon, 560 U.S. __ (2010) (warrant not required for searches performed
for non-investigatory work-related purposes or to investigate workplace
misconduct).
97 68 American Jurisprudence 2nd edn, Searches and Seizures § 104 (1993).
98 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
354 (1974)).
99 United States v Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
100 Walder v United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
101 United States v Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 (1975).
102 Id.
103 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
104 United States v Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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privacy in information shared with a third party. The
case involved cancelled checks, to which, the Court
noted, ‘respondent can assert neither ownership nor
possession’.105 Such documents ‘contain only informa-
tion voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to
their employees in the ordinary course of business’,106
and therefore the Court found that the Fourth Amend-
ment is not implicated when the government sought
access to them:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government. This Court has held repeatedly
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtain-
ing of information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by him to Government authorities, even if the information
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed.107
The Court’s decision in Miller is remarkably sweeping.
The bank did not just happen to be holding the
records the government sought. Instead, the Bank
Secrecy Act required (and continues to require) banks
to maintain a copy of every customer check and
deposit for six years or longer.108 The government thus
compelled the bank to store the information, and then
sought the information from the bank on the basis that
since the bank held the data, there could not be any
reasonable expectation of privacy and the Fourth
Amendment therefore did not apply.109 The Supreme
Court was not troubled by this apparent end-run
around the Fourth Amendment: ‘even if the banks
could be said to have been acting solely as Government
agents in transcribing the necessary information and
complying without protest with the requirements of
the subpoenas, there would be no intrusion upon the
depositors’ Fourth Amendment rights.’110
The Court reinforced its holding in Miller in the
1979 case of Smith v Maryland, involving information
about (as opposed to the content of) telephone calls.111
The Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment
is inapplicable to telecommunications ‘attributes’ (eg
the number dialled, the time the call was placed, the
duration of the call, etc.), because that information is
necessarily conveyed to, or observable by, third parties
involved in connecting the call.112 ‘[T]elephone users,
in sum, typically know that they must convey numeric-
al information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information;
and that the phone company does in fact record this
information for a variety of legitimate business pur-
poses.’113
As a result, under the Fourth Amendment, the use
of ‘pen registers’ (to record out-going call information)
and ‘trap and trace’ devices (to record in-coming call
information) does not require a warrant because they
only collect information about the call that is necessar-
ily disclosed to others.114 As with information disclosed
to financial institutions,115 Congress reacted to the
Supreme Court’s decision by creating modest statutory
requirements applicable to pen registers,116 but the
Constitution does not apply.
While the Miller third-party doctrine and its binary
view of privacy have never been overruled or even
questioned by a majority of the Court and have gener-
ally been followed by lower courts, the Supreme Court
has declined to apply the doctrine in at least one case
in which the Court found extensive and routine in-
volvement of law enforcement in the design and ad-
ministration of the third party’s collection of data. In
Ferguson v Charleston,117 the Court held that a hospital
drug-screening program for pregnant women that pro-
vided the results to local police without the women’s
consent, in order to use threats of prosecution to
prompt them to seek counselling and treatment, vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia dissented,
noting: ‘Until today, we have never held—or even sug-
gested—that material which a person voluntarily
entrusts to someone else cannot be given by that
person to the police, and used for whatever evidence it
may contain.’118
In City of Ontario v Quon, the Court assumed that
city police officers retained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in text messages sent via employer-provided
pagers, notwithstanding the fact that the contents of
the messages were stored on a third-party provider’s
(rather than the city’s) servers.119 The Court found that
105 Id. at 440.
106 Id. at 442.
107 Id. at 443 (citation omitted).
108 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d); see 425 U.S. at 436; California Bankers Assn. v
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
109 425 U.S. at 443.
110 Id. at 444.
111 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
112 Id. at 743.
113 Id.
114 Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
115 Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422.
116 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 1841.
117 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
118 Id. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119 560 U.S. at __.
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the city’s review of transcripts of such messages, sup-
plied by the third-party provider upon request, was
performed for legitimate, non-investigatory work-
related purposes, was reasonable in scope, and thus was
constitutional.120 While noting that the messages were
stored by the third party and not the city, the Court
made no mention of Miller or Smith and undertook no
analysis of any potential application of the third-party
doctrine.121 Accordingly, it is difficult to deduce any
impact on the doctrine from this case, including
whether the Court might draw a line between govern-
ment access to communication contents, which Quon
involved, and access to communications attributes
(Smith) or records the specific contents of which are
necessary to the third party’s business (Miller).122
In the absence of such doctrinal limits, advances in
technologies, and the development of new products
and services in response to those changes, have signifi-
cantly expanded the scope of the Miller exclusion of
records held by third parties from the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. Today there are vastly more per-
sonal data in the hands of third parties, they are far
more revealing, and they are much more readily access-
ible than was the case in the 1970s. Moreover, for the
first time, the government has the practical ability to
exploit huge data sets. As a result, the scope of the
Miller decision has been greatly expanded and the
balance between the government’s power to obtain per-
sonal data and the privacy rights of individuals sub-
stantially altered.
United States v Jones
One of the Supreme Court’s most recent and signifi-
cant Fourth Amendment cases, United States v Jones,123
has challenged established Fourth Amendment privacy
jurisprudence. Four justices of the Court (Scalia,
Roberts, Kennedy, and Thomas), joined by Justice
Sotomayor, reinterpreted Katz to find that the Fourth
Amendment protects both people and places. The
Court found that attaching a GPS device to the
bumper of a suspect’s car without a warrant constituted
an unlawful search irrespective of any expectations of
privacy because the government’s action constituted a
trespass to private property. The Court wrote that ‘the
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespas-
sory test’.124
While one could argue that the Court’s resurrection
of common-law trespass as an independent basis for in-
voking the Fourth Amendment—after 45 years of reli-
ance on the Katz standard—worked an expansion of
privacy rights, four concurring justices (Alito, Gins-
burg, Breyer, and Kagan) argued that the majority’s
focus on trespass obscured the real privacy violation by
the government: ‘[T]he Court’s reasoning largely disre-
gards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the
purpose of long-term tracking) and instead attaches
great significance to something that most would view
as relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a
small, light object that does not interfere in any way
with the car’s operation).’125 This, the justices argue, is
particularly problematic in the modern age when
around-the-clock monitoring of a vehicle’s location can
be accomplished by activating the vehicle’s stolen
vehicle detection system or tracking one of the occu-
pant’s cell phones.126
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence in
which she argued that it might be time for the Court
to revisit Miller and the third-party doctrine:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks. . . . I would not assume that all informa-
tion voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public
for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled
to Fourth Amendment protection.127
Freedom of Information Act
Not all of the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence
addresses constitutional issues. The federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) permits ‘any person’ to obtain
access to all federal ‘agency records’, subject to nine
120 Id. at __. The Court declined to decide whether ‘operational realities’
might limit a government employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy
in communications on employer-issued devices, but nonetheless
discussed in dicta some of the factors that it would have to consider if it
undertook that inquiry; notably, the storage of such communications
with a third party provider was not among the factors mentioned.
121 The Court held that any violation of statutory privacy protections
(under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.) by the
provider in giving the city the text message contents upon request, did
not invalidate the city’s otherwise reasonable search. Id. at __.
122 While the city, and not individual personnel, made the decision to use
the third-party provider, arguably this has no bearing on the potential
application of the doctrine, since the storage of personal information
with a third party in Miller and Smith was no less involuntary, from a
practical standpoint.
123 __ U.S. __, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1063.
124 Id. at __ (emphasis in original).
125 Id. at __ (Alito, J., concurring).
126 Id. at __.
127 Id. at __ (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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enumerated exemptions.128 Two of the nine exemptions
are designed to protect privacy: Exemption 6 precludes
disclosure of ‘personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy’, and Exemption 7(c)
bans release of ‘records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes [which] . . . could reasonably
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy’.129
The Supreme Court has decided cases interpreting
the extent of both exemptions and, in the process, of
‘privacy’. In 1989, the Court decided U.S. Department
of Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press,130 which involved press access to law enforce-
ment rap sheets. The press argued that because the
information in an individual’s rap sheet was compiled
from local, publically available law enforcement and
court records, the individual could not assert any
privacy right. The Court disagreed, writing: ‘We
reject respondents’ cramped notion of personal
privacy’.131
The Court wrote, ‘both the common law and the
literal understandings of privacy encompass the indivi-
dual’s control of information concerning his or her
person. In an organized society, there are few facts that
are not at one time or another divulged to another.’132
According to the Court, previous disclosure does not
automatically remove the privacy interest. Instead, ‘the
extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at
common law rested in part on the degree of dissemin-
ation of the allegedly private fact and the extent to
which the passage of time rendered it private.’133 The
Court went on to note that according to ‘Webster’s
initial definition, information may be classified as
“private” if it is “intended for or restricted to the use
of a particular person or group or class of persons: not
freely available to the public”.’134
Based on this nuanced interpretation of privacy, the
Court found that FBI rap sheets, even if they contain
only material that is held by local law enforcement
agencies and courts and that material has been made
public, are nevertheless ‘private’ within the meaning of
FOIA because of the passage of time, the limited
purposes motivating that disclosure, and the fact that
rap sheets aggregate otherwise disparate pieces of infor-
mation.
The Court in Reporter’s Committee quoted approv-
ingly from a speech by then-Justice William Rehnquist:
‘In sum, the fact that “an event is not wholly ‘private’
does not mean that an individual has no interest in
limiting disclosure or dissemination of the informa-
tion”.’135 The Court concluded its analysis: ‘The privacy
interest in a rap sheet is substantial. The substantial
character of that interest is affected by the fact that in
today’s society the computer can accumulate and store
information that would otherwise have surely been for-
gotten long before a person attains age 80, when the
FBI’s rap sheets are discarded.’136
Five years later, the Supreme Court relied on its
broad definition of privacy from Reporter’s Committee
in a case involving FOIA’s other privacy exemption, Ex-
emption 6, which applies to ‘personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly un-warranted invasion of personal
privacy’.137 In United States Department of Defense v
Federal Labor Relations Authority,138 the Court was
faced with a request by two unions for certain federal
employees’ home addresses.
Addressing the issue of whether information as
public as home addresses could ever be considered
private, the Court wrote: ‘It is true that home addresses
often are publicly available through sources such as
telephone directories and voter registration lists, but
“in an organized society, there are few facts that are
not at one time or another divulged to another”.’139
The Court noted that the ‘individual’s interest in con-
trolling the dissemination of information regarding
personal matters does not dissolve simply because that
information may be available to the public in some
form’.140 The Court found that ‘it is clear that
[individuals] have some nontrivial privacy interest in
nondisclosure’.141 The Court, therefore, found that
Exemption 6 prohibited the disclosure of federal
employees’ addresses.
128 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1997).
129 Id. § 552(b)(6)–(7)(C).
130 489 U.S. 749 (1989)
131 Id. at 763.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 763–64.
135 Id. at 710–71 (quoting William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of
Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, Nelson
Timothy Stephens Lectures, University of Kansas Law School, pt. 1,
p. 13 (Sept. 26–27, 1974)).
136 Id. at 771. In National Archives and Records Administration v Favish, 541
U.S. 157 (2004), the Supreme Court further expanded its understanding
of the ‘privacy’ at issue in FOIA cases, by extending Exemption 7(c) to
family members of an individual who committed suicide.
137 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
138 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
139 Id. at 550 (quoting Reporter’s Committee, 489 U.S. at 763).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 501.
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Assessment
It is not surprising that many commentators have con-
sidered the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence to
be confused and disjointed. The Court not only uses
the term in a variety of different settings, but has
defined it to have at least three distinct meanings.
The first, which the Court has described variously as
a ‘right of personal privacy’ or ‘areas or zones of
privacy’,142 is constitutionally protected to the extent
the right can be deemed to involve decisions whose
personal nature is ‘“fundamental”’ or ‘“implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty”.’143 The Court has found
fundamental rights of private decision making concern-
ing marriage, procreation, contraception, consensual
sexual relations, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.144 As noted above, this right generally does
not implicate information privacy, except in limited
contexts involving compelled disclosures (both to and
from the pregnant woman) surrounding abortion.
The second meaning of privacy comes from the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In this
setting, the Court has provided a specific definition:
whatever one ‘seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public’,145 provided that the indi-
vidual has an ‘actual’, subjective expectation of privacy,
and that expectation is ‘one that society was prepared
to recognize as “reasonable”.’146 The Court has crafted
many exceptions to this right, the most significant
being that for information to be treated as private, it
must not have been disclosed to, or be held by, a third
party.147 As a result, this understanding of privacy is es-
sentially binary: information is either not disclosed and
therefore private or it has been disclosed and therefore
is not private. And this constitutional understanding of
privacy is solely concerned with the collection of data,
not with its retention, use or sharing.
The Court describes its third meaning of privacy in
the constitutional context as ‘the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . .’148 The
Court has explicitly noted that information that the
government constitutionally may require an individual
to disclose for one purpose, may nevertheless remain
sensitive and subject to privacy protections. Many legit-
imate government activities ‘all require the orderly
preservation of great quantities of information, much
of which is personal in character and potentially
embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to
collect and use such data for public purposes is typical-
ly accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regula-
tory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.’149 Despite
the fact that the information has been disclosed to, and
is held by, someone other than the data subject, ‘in
some circumstances that duty [to avoid unwarranted
disclosures] arguably has its roots in the Constitu-
tion.’150 Nevertheless, this interest in non-disclosure
was recognized in Whalen, a case upholding the com-
pelled disclosure of prescription information, and has
not yet invoked strict scrutiny by the Court of a gov-
ernment data-related activity.
In the statutory context, the Court has used this third
meaning of privacy to block disclosure under FOIA. Re-
peatedly, the Court has found that even though infor-
mation has been disclosed to and is held by third
parties, this does not eliminate the existence of a lawfully
protected privacy interest. ‘[T]he fact that “an event is
not wholly ‘private’ does not mean that an individual
has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of
the information”.’151 This is a far more subtle view of
privacy, in which privacy is measured on a spectrum,
rather than the binary view of privacy that the Court
applies in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The fact that there is inconsistency in the Court’s
privacy jurisprudence is not surprising. In fact, the
Court itself noted in Reporter’s Committee that the
‘question of the statutory meaning of privacy under the
FOIA is, of course, not the same as the question
whether a tort action might lie for invasion of privacy
or the question whether an individual’s interest in
privacy is protected by the Constitution.’152 However,
the Court is inconsistent even within its constitutional
privacy jurisprudence, employing the term in Whalen
to mean something broad and subtle and requiring
protection beyond mere collection limits, and in the
Court’s Fourth Amendment cases to refer to something
that can be eliminated by disclosure, and requires no
protection beyond collection limits.
Even more significant than the inconsistency,
however, is that the meaning of privacy that the Court
142 Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. at 152.
143 Id. (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
144 410 U.S. at 152–3; Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558.
145 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
146 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
147 Miller, 425 U.S. 435; Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
148 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599–600.
149 Id. at 605.
150 Id.
151 489 U.S. at 710–711 (quoting William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right
of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, Nelson
Timothy Stephens Lectures, University of Kansas Law School, pt. 1,
p. 13 (Sept. 26–27, 1974)).
152 489 U.S. at 763 n.13.
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has so far articulated in its Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence is inconsistent with popular perceptions
about the meaning of privacy and renders the Fourth
Amendment impotent to protect against government
intrusions into vast collections of personal information,
given the extraordinary increase in both the volume
and sensitivity of information about individuals neces-
sarily held by third parties.
Professor Daniel Solove writes: ‘We are becoming a
society of records, and these records are not held by us,
but by third parties.’153 Thanks to the proliferation of
digital technologies and networks such as the internet, and
tremendous advances in the capacity of storage devices
and parallel decreases in their cost and physical size, those
records are linked and shared more widely and stored far
longer than ever before, often without the individual con-
sumer’s knowledge or consent.154 This is especially true as
more activities move online, where merchants record data
not only on what individuals buy and how we pay for our
purchases, but also on every detail of what we look at,
what we search for, how we navigate through web sites,
and with whom we communicate.
The Miller exclusion from the Fourth Amendment
of information disclosed to third parties means that all
of this information, no matter how sensitive or how
revealing of a person’s health, finances, tastes, or con-
victions, is available to the government without consti-
tutional limit. The government’s demand need not be
reasonable, no warrant is necessary, and no judicial au-
thorization or oversight is required. Jones raises the
possibility that at least some members of the Court rec-
ognize the impact of technological change on the
Fourth Amendment’s protection for privacy, and may
even be willing to revisit Miller, but the outcome is far
from certain.
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